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Preservation of National Identity and   
Interests in the Enlarged EU 
I. Introduction 
Nation state
1 is product of 19
th century as historical category. What will 
happen with it in 21
st century in Europe with dominance of the EU as supra 
national entity in form of (con) federation ? EU membership does not re-
quire special protective activity for its richest and largest member states as 
their identity is strongly implanted in population, protected by the sheer 
fact of size and economic power and without danger of extinction. What 
about small and less developed members of EU ?  Is coalition among them 
strong enough to prevent disappearance of national identity or they need 
active approach, based on national interests, to protect themselves from as-
similation. This question is even more relevant and critical for even smaller 
and poorer newcomers to the family of EU members. Should they care 
about their identity, express their national interest and act accordingly ? 
EU membership is desired goal for all acceding countries and solution 
without serious alternative for several reasons (economic, social, political, 
security). It was voted for in referendums in all candidate countries besides 
Cyprus, where it is decision of Parliament. But it could have some negative 
side effects, one of them being the threat of membership to their national 
identity and national interests. To mitigate them, it is important for new 
member states to be well prepared and to choose the best possible way for 
 
1 One nation = one country does not hold always, and if not, in multinational states na-
tionality is not the same as citizenship.  Franjo Štiblar 
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accession. The goal should be that the new members enter the EU as equal 
partners as possible to old strong members, rejecting the position of periph-
ery as the only solution for them in enlarged EU. They should strive to 
come as close as possible to centers of the EU achieving the position of 
semi-periphery (Wallerstein, 1974) at least in some fields of economic, so-
cial life, ethnicity. In cost benefit analysis the welfare of population, na-
tions  includes preservation of national identity. The proposed EU Constitu-
tion declares preservation of cultural diversity as one of main principles 
and not amalgamation. Therefore, it is in national interest to retain some 
elements of economic, social and political sovereignty to the degree old 
strong EU members do.
2 For achieving this goal economic foundations are 
needed to execute the proper strategy. 
Different strategies have been applied by different 10 new EU member 
countries in the process of their accession. Most countries used shock ther-
apy to liberalize economy totally thus selling all their best economic units 
(blue chips) and even natural resources to rich foreign countries, predomi-
nantly existing EU members and to lesser extent to the USA. Slovenia, on 
contrary, opted for a gradual approach of transformation and transition. It 
still has a possibility to obtain position in the enlarged EU similar to exist-
ing small and less developed members. The quick all out “reformists, liber-
als and transformers among new member states, however, gave up eco-
nomic instruments to follow their own economic and social, political strat-
egy, even if they would like to have one. They are destined to become infe-
rior members in the periphery of enlarged EU.  
The goal of this paper is to deal with the solution to the problem of preserv-
ing national identity in national interest as relevant element of welfare of 
population in accessing countries and (and, to that extend, in existing small 
and less developed EU members). First, basic notions of national identity 
and interest will be defined and placed in theoretical framework. Second, 
presence of these notions (“national” against “European”) in EU constitu-
tion will be reviewed and formal criteria for deciding on substance of na-
 
2 Similar strategies are relevant and executed by small and poorer existing members of 
the EU as showed by Katzenstein (1986). Preservation of National Identity and Interests in the Enlarged EU 
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tional interests in different fields of life will be proposed. Third, these crite-
ria will be applied to economic sphere of life and at the end, to other sphere 
of life. The intention is to define which solutions are in national interest to 
preserve national identity and thus achieve the optimal welfare of popula-
tion, which is possible under available resources.     
II. Theory: Definition of National Identity and Interest 
Speaking about national identity is generally acceptable in public (media, 
politicians) and proper. Opposition would mean rejecting common history, 
cultural developments of nation; creating new creature “European”. But, 
speaking about national interests could quickly be described as nationalistic 
in pejorative sense and therefore improper (not so if European interests or 
regional interests are in question ?), not global enough and against the con-
cept of unified Europe as federation ? How can we reconcile these antago-
nisms ?  
There is a strong connection between (national) identity and (national) in-
terest. If identity means being aware of common historic experience, cul-
ture, set of values, beliefs then interest means explicitly expressing needs, 
desires which help to preserve, protect and underline identity. After know-
ing who we are we conclude what we want. Or, what we want depends 
strongly on who we are. Next step, after being aware of identity and ex-
pressing want we want, is the action based on national interest to preserve 
or support, enhance national identity. For that reason we will continue with 
speaking about interests as expressed views on (preserving, enhancing) na-
tional identity. 
Without having exact criteria to evaluate which of the two or more opposite 
view, activity, substance (answer) is in national interests and which is not, 
(political) power is used as instrument of prevalence. Not what, but who 
decides is relevant and prevails. Can it be done better ?  
As several solutions are proposed on similar level of concrete life as sup-
porting national identity and being in national interest it is crucial to decide 
which among them is the “true national interest” ? For solving this problem Franjo Štiblar 
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we propose, first, a step back in direction of abstraction, which means crea-
tion of criteria (elements) for evaluation what is national interest, and sec-
ond, application of these criteria on proposed concrete answers, solutions, 
views in different fields of human life to decide which among them is 
really in national interest and which is not. Value judgments will remain in 
definition of national interest, so that it is necessary to stress and be aware 
that this exercise has limited ability to solve the problem. But a step further 
from un-fruitful polemics on equal level could be made with application of 
criteria for evaluation what really is in national interest (to preserve na-
tional identity).   
How to define elements (criteria) for notion of “national interest” per se or 
national identity and what relations are between the two ? There are two 
words in definition, “interest/identity”, and “national” and each deserves 
special theoretical attention.  
a) Identity/Interest 
Different fields of science and even different schools within each science 
give different definitions of “interest”, specific only to their line of thought. 
Aggregate (integrated) definition is needed if desired criteria have intention 
to be widely applied in all fields of human life. 
Interest is active relation of individual to the environment (Bibic, 1972). 
In theory relations among major concepts are defined by structuralists as 
following causal chain (Wendt, 1999): 
IDEAS (common historical and natural heritage, culture, tradition, mem-
ory, values) 
IDENTITIES include trust, opinion, beliefs, awarness: who agents are, self-
consciousness, 
INTERESTS: include what individuals want, wish, need . It is special rela-
tion between subject and object in which subject is in more or less intensive 
relation with object (having and showing interest is first step for activity to 
express it), 
 Preservation of National Identity and Interests in the Enlarged EU 
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NEEDS (objective interests),    PREFERENCES (tastes, desires) 
Functional imperatives, agent    (subjective interests)             
should adjust to them;      they  are  motives,  not  behavior     
Need to be fulfilled if individual  regarding  results,  not  strategies         
is to reproduce himself 
Desires are sub-species of beliefs, that is desirable beliefs how to achieve 
the goal. 
ACTION  (behavior of subject, agent; activity to fulfill needs, preferences) 
This is a causal chain: ideas define identity which defines needs and prefer-
ences and they cause action. Historical background and common experi-
ence create, define ideas of people (in certain geographical area). These 
ideas define identities of human beings, knowledge who we are (self-
awareness, subjectively explicitly recognized). Identities define interests, 
what we want or need, and these are cause for our action, which means to 
implement interests which express our identities, created a long ago in the 
historical process of common experience. 
Definitions of categories: 
•  identity = whatever makes the thing what it is, 
•  interest = active relation to environment, 
•  sovereignty = exclusivity, originality, supremacy. 
Defense mechanisms of small states against drowning in the EU 25 are 
(Igličar, 2002): legal institutions (language, cultural and natural heritage); 
monuments and memorials, settling of geographic area, especially the bor-
der regions. 
b) National 
Interest is related only to man in the form of active self-awarness. Individ-
ual interests can be transformed into collective (group) interests and then 
general interests. These are public, if expressed within country, and na-Franjo Štiblar 
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tional (state)
3, if expressed in relation to other countries. Several criteria 
exist for aggregation of individual interests into general as for instance 
common interests defined by education (economists, lawyres), employment 
(truck drivers, nurses), sex (women, men), class (workers, elite). Important 
criteria is geography/demography. By it individual interest are merged into 
family interests, and further to village, city, region, state (national), coun-
try, continent, all human on earth interests.
4 As institutional borders were 
the strongest for the state (country) in 19
th, 20
th century with the formation 
of national state as historical category, national interests became the most 
important. But, with globalization it is easy to image that supra-national 
entities will become stronger (for instance the EU, the USA) and their in-
terest more important. That aggregation to the new supra-state entity with 
geographically more distant center (for the EU Brussels, for instance) with 
more general interest it has to take into account as average, will have no 
doubt reaction in the form of revival of sub-national interests as specific on 
regional or village, community level, where they can be better identified 
easier and fulfilled, for reasons both of distance and need to make all ac-
tions proper on average for all population in this supra-national entity. 
c) Synthetic definition of criteria for national interest 
Micro level of individual 
National interest is basically common interest of nationals. It is type of 
general interest, but a new quality, more than only sum of individual inter-
est of nationals. Activities, statements, views which reveal and support na-
tional interest and thus fulfill needs, desires of nationals helping to preserve 
 
3 In Anglo-Saxon tradition and language nation state is dominant form, so that there is 
no difference between nationality and citizenship. The opposite is in continental 
Europe with multinational states a usual form. Therefore national interest means in 
fact the state interest for Americans and it is accepted as benign notion, while national 
interest in continental Europe very quickly obtains  malign, pejorative co-notation  of 
nationalism due to negative historical experience which ended with the war on several 
occassions.   
4 For purpose of this study the most important is division between national and Euro-
pean interest with sub national (commune) interest emergin as reaction to surrendering 
national to European interests. Preservation of National Identity and Interests in the Enlarged EU 
  9
and (re)affirm national identity and which enable individual interests to 
contribute to general interest, are the ones that (Bibić 1972): 
•  enable development of human working abilities and his creativity, eco-
nomic, technological abilities and personal creativity (art and culture, 
sport) and achievements, 
•  increase and develop of human needs and desires, and their expansion 
for and by informing educated individual; 
•  enable satisfaction of these increased needs and desires, activities which 
with higher degree of satisfaction of enlarged volume of needs (and de-
sires) increase human welfare. 
In summary, activity, solution, statement is in national (micro) interest if 
enables development of human productivity and creativity, expansion of its 
needs and desires and increasing degree of their satisfaction.  
Macro level of (national) state 
General interest is public on intra-country level and national in inter-
country level. 
Public interest is general interest as sum of individual interests of citizens, 
which are legitimated by the state or qualified as such in internal life of 
community even without blessing of the state. Its creators are the state, 
non-formal civil groups, factors of idea and sub-consciousness (Bučar, 
1969). 
General interest of one country against others obtains the form of national 
interest if contributes to: 
•  preservation of country and its physical survival, 
•  independence and autonomy of country, 
•  geographic integrity of country, 
•  welfare of citizens, 
•  collective self-esteem of citizens. Franjo Štiblar 
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First three elements are included as criteria by realists (Morgenthau, 1995), 
the last two added by structuralists (Wendt, 1999) among the theorists of 
international relations. The last two indicate that structuralists, in difference 
to realists, give priority to idea over power in international relations.  
Synthesis of micro and macro 
Elements of micro and macro definition of national interest could be syn-
thesized in one: only in an independent, integrated (national) state can their 
nationals freely develop their productivity and creativity, recognize new 
needs and increasingly satisfy them. This possibility can increase general 
welfare of individuals which adds to their self-esteem. 
d) How to reject the notion of “nationalism” in defining national inter-
est? 
First, we extend (expand) the set of individuals, living in the country, 
which interests are generalized (taken into account to form general interest 
as the largest common denominator) from members of single nationality to 
formal citizens of the country (which can be of different nationality) or, 
even further, to all permanent residents in the country, which due to their 
permanent residence take care of environment they live in and pay taxes for 
commonly fulfilled needs and desires (education, health, protection of envi-
ronment, culture, sports).
5 And not only natural persons, they it can be legal 
persons too. If they are established with the head office in the country and 
thus final decisions are made in the country, at the same time by the people 
who permanently live in the country, even if they are not nationals or even 
not citizens of the country, they will strive for legal, business, ecologic, so-
cial environment in the country, which will be of interest of all residents 
and firms in the country.  
Thus, from the notion of “Blut und Boden” as criteria for common national 
interest (blood and area interconnected) we have just relaxed condition of 
 
5 Some of my student think that expansion of general interest taken into account to per-
manent residents goes too far (and should be stopped at least at citizenship) because 
permanent residency is easy to obtain and loose (change) and its obtaining does not Preservation of National Identity and Interests in the Enlarged EU 
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“Blut” through expanded definition of national = residential interest. What 
about “Boden”, area ?  First, it is not flexible, because it does not move 
around. Second, the only one who can move to achieve the best match be-
tween Blut und Boden are human beings – individuals. People, nations, 
leaving in certain area as predominant in the history developed certain val-
ues, culture, behavioral characteristics (that is identity) known for that area. 
Now, individuals, legal entities (firms, etc.) can move around the world (in 
that sense Europeans can travel and settle in each EU member state and es-
tablish firm there) to find the environment, country, area, which is the best 
fitted to their desires and needs (interests) for reasons not only of nature 
and climate, but also values, behavior, regulation (elements for natural and 
legal persons) and therefore decide to establish permanent residence there. 
Newcomers should accept the existing rules, behavior there, not force their 
own values to override the existing old identity of residents in the area. 
They can not expect from old settlers to change identity or, if not, to move 
and make space for newcomers. This way both elements, blood and area, 
can be harmonized and made adequate (homogeneous) to each other.    
e) Newcomers as close to the center of enlarged EU as possible 
Discussion on preserving national identity through following national in-
terests in activity of accession to the EU among 10 newcomers can be ele-
vated to entirely confirmative level, not negative exclusion of interest of 
other, no matter how increased crowd, group of people they are. 
In positioning accessing EU countries in the enlarged EU (and for that pur-
pose the same holds for the small less developed present members of EU) 
Wallerstein’s theory of global village is used in which there are three re-
gions center, semi-periphery and periphery. The role of periphery in global 
village is characterized extremely negative by Wallerstein (1974), (much 
more than “outer region” which does not belong to global village), not only 
for worse living conditions but also because of its exploitation by the cen-
ter; semi-periphery is somewhere in between and center concentrates all the 
 
require knowledge of language, history as precondition, neither identification with his-
torical, heritage and thus do not preserve existing national identity. Franjo Štiblar 
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goods of life standard, production quality and welfare on general. It was 
also observed by Wallerstein that in 16
th century, for which this segmenta-
tion was given, elites in periphery try to be recognized and equal to elites in 
the center thus “selling interest of their regions” to get points in the center 
and alienating themselves from their own population in the periphery.   
Analogy can be used for enlarged EU as global village. It is in national in-
terest of newcomers to the enlarged EU to strive to be as close as possible 
to the center or at least semi-periphery and not to remain only neglected 
and exploited periphery. It means for individuals on micro level enabling 
productivity growth and conditions for expansion of creativity at home (in 
the country), possibility to increase needs and desires and increasingly sat-
isfying them in home country: good schools, theatres, sport events avail-
able at home, not only on TV from centers or by traveling to the centers to 
enjoy them. For the country on macro level it means retaining some degree 
of economic (and social) sovereignty (independence, autonomy, integrity) 
with possibility to decide on its strategic priorities and ability to realize 
them with available instruments.    
How to achieve this, after accession is decided, is strategic question to 
choose the optimal way for affirmation of residents’ interest of people in 
the acceding small country. This way, it is not anymore nationalism but 
positive, affirmative effort to achieve the most equal position possible for 
newcomers in the enlarged EU. On comparative level, it is position pres-
ently experienced by existing small less developed members of the EU 
(Greece, Portugal), although even they should strive to improve their posi-
tion to come closer to the center of the EU.  
For this to achieve, country needs it own strategy of economic and overall 
social development and instruments to execute it. As most macro instru-
ments will be yielded to Brussels and Frankfurt, micro instruments are 
needed in the form of at least some strong blue chips in real and financial 
sector retained under domestic control (or at least with  decision-making 
process with final decisions made in the country), that is in majority do-
mestic ownership.    Preservation of National Identity and Interests in the Enlarged EU 
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It is clear that all countries could not be center as London, Berlin, Vienna 
Rome, but in certain areas of life they should become closer to the center. 
The story is similar to the intra-country regional policies. But, structural 
funds of the EU are not sufficient instrument to achieve this goal of equal 
regional, inter-country development due to limited amount of funds and 
restrictive definition of purposes they can be used for. Their main weakness 
is that the purpose they could be used for is determined by Brussels and not 
by receiving countries and their under-developed regions themselves, so 
that sub-national interests are not sufficiently taken into account. 
In creation of the EU, forces for further integration should come from be-
low as freely expressed interests, not being imposed from the authorities 
and elites above (in manner of regionalism). This will prevent from making 
mistakes, made in history, as for instance creation of super-national coun-
tries (world wars, conflicts on one hand, and collapse of such entities as 
Soviet Union or Yugoslavia, on other hand). 
III. Identities and Interests in the Constitution of Europe 
To what extend and in what form are basic categories national identity and 
interest values, identities, interests and actions present Constitution of 
Europe ? The goal is to find out how much is national identity preserved 
and national interests taken into account against the possibility to force   
European identity and pan-European interests as wider geographic and 
demographic entity. Is there a plan to create through amalgamation in the 
time a united “European nation” (for instance, as it was in the past during 
45 years of socialist Yugoslavia intention of leaders to create “Yugoslav 
nation” with final outcome well known) ?  
Several articles (provisions) in proposed Constitution of Europe deal with 
the term (national, European) identity, (national, European) interest, values, 
and other with term identity and interests of Europe. Detailed overview 
shows the following: 
 
 Franjo Štiblar 
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Article 3: The Union’ objectives 
Paragraph 3: The Union shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diver-
sity, and shall ensure that Europe’s cultural heritage is safeguarded and en-
hanced  (intra EU). 
Paragraph 4: In relations with wider world (inter-relation EU and rest of the 
world), the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests (peace 
and security, sustainable development, solidarity, mutual respect among 
people, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty, protection of human, es-
pecially children’s rights, strict observance of international law, including 
principles of UN Charter). 
Article 4: Fundamental freedoms and non-discrimination 
Paragraph 2: … any discrimination on grounds of nationality should be 
prohibited in the field of application of EU Constitution… 
Article 5: Relation between the Union and Member States 
Paragraph 1: The Union shall respect national identities of member states, 
inherent in their structures, inclusive regional and local self-government. It 
shall respect their essential State functions, including territorial identity and 
integrity of the State… 
Article 8: Citizenship of the Union 
Paragraph 1: Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to national citi-
zenship, it shall not replace it.  
Paragraph 2: Citizens of the Union shall enjoy….the right to vote and stand 
as candidate in elections to European parliament and municipal elections in 
their Member State of residence under the same conditions as nationals of 
the state… 
Article 9:  
Paragraph 1: The limits of Union competences are governed by the princi-
ple of conferral. The use of Union competences is governed by the princi-
ples of subsidiarity and proportionality. Preservation of National Identity and Interests in the Enlarged EU 
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Some competences are exclusive (with primacy of the Union’ law), some 
are shared; some policies are coordinated, some are common (foreign and 
security), some actions are supporting, coordinating and complementary, 
some can be given by Council of Ministers under flexibility clause.  
Article 18 
Paragraph 1: The Union shall be served by a single institutional framework 
which shall aim to advance the objectives of the Union, promote its values 
and serve interests of the Union, its citizens and member states (But, what 
prevails if conflict of interests appears among the three levels ?) 
Article 43 
Paragraph 1: Enhanced cooperation among Member states of the Union , 
possible where the Union does not have exclusive competences, shall aim 
to further the objectives of the Union, protect its interests and reinforce its 
integration process. 
Article 49 
Paragraph 4: A European law shall lay down the general principles and 
limits which, on grounds of public or private interest, govern the rights of 
access to documents of the Union.        
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union 
Preamble 
The Union contributes to the preservation and to the development of com-
mon values (human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity; principles of 
democracy and the rule of 
6law) while respecting the diversity of the cul-
tures and traditions of the peoples of Europe as well as national identities of 
their Member States and their organization… 
Article II-17: Rights to Property 
Paragraph 2: No one may be deprived of his or her possessions, except in 
the public interest ... regulated by law insofar it is necessary for the general 
interest… 
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Comment 
According to proposed Constitution EU respects diversities among member 
countries in culture, language and national identities of member states (in-
tra-relation). EU will expand its EU values, common heritage, identity, to 
the rest of the world (inter-relations). It means that they already exist as 
commonly accepted, but what if they are in conflict with some national 
identities, values, interests ? Most of articles are written as if differences in 
identities and interests among different levels of aggregation (member state 
: EU) do not exist, while local, private interests are scarcely mentioned as 
existing. Promotion of the EU values, interests can create conflicts within 
EU and outside it. Even bilateral cooperation among member states is re-
stricted. In that sense and with the regard of subject of this study Constitu-
tion of Europe is desired wishful thinking how it should be in ideal world 
without taking into account its realities. 
However, citizenship or even permanent residence rather than nationality is 
important for elections, which is according to proposed concept in this pa-
per. 
IV. Application of National/Residential Interest to the 
Economy 
After theoretical criteria for deciding on residential interest are defined and 
the strategic goal established (for 10 newcomers to become as equal as pos-
sible members of enlarged EU), and after presence of these concepts in 
Constitution of the EU is reviewed, we come to the question arises on how 
to implement them in everyday life. 
a) Theoretical reasons to take into account national/residential inter-
est in the economy 
Several economic theories support the view that national (resident) interest 
should be taken into account for preserving national identity and also indi-
cate in what form it should be done. Preservation of National Identity and Interests in the Enlarged EU 
  17
1. Theory of small states in Europe and world markets (Katzenstein, 1986) 
emphasizes great adaptability of small countries of Europe to external 
shocks. Similar adaptability will be needed by large countries as due to pre-
sent globalization they are all becoming small countries in the world mar-
kets.  Small states have developed two models: socio-corporative model 
(Austria) and liberal corporative model (Switzerland) as the way to pre-
serve their sovereignty and independence in globalization processes. Ac-
cessing countries should learn from models of behavior of these small 
members of the EU how to preserve national identity, sovereignty, by fol-
lowing national/residential interests. 
2. As long as the large countries in the EU follow strategy and policy of 
affirmation their national interests (more or less consciously and organ-
ized), and this way deform Pareto optimum solutions of fully competitive 
markets in general equilibrium theory it is right for small countries (access-
ing and existing EU members) to find the same “second best solutions” for 
achieving optimum for themselves. Ignoring foreign country intervention 
strategies and activities as if they do not exist and acting with full liberali-
zation of entry, market and ownership as first best would no doubt lead 
small countries in the inferior position against foreign (neighboring) coun-
tries. 
When larger members of EU do not allow free entry to their markets, do 
not want to sell their “blue chips” to foreigners, make import restrictions 
for sensitive products (agriculture, textiles, steel, chemicals), small ones 
should react in the same way to protect their relatively independent posi-
tion. It will be illusion to expect that big ones will follow the example of 
small ones in liberalizing fully their economies by feeling obliged to small 
countries to copy them.    
3. Prisoners dilemma in game theory (Rasmusen, 1993) states that 
non/cooperation of partners in the judicial process (due to lack of trust be-
tween them) leads to the worst possible solution (highest prison sentence) 
for each of them and thus both of them together. Cooperation between the 
two (each saying that they did not commit the crime and that partner did Franjo Štiblar 
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not either) and trust (hoping that other partner will not blame first one for 
crime) will, on contrary, lead to the smallest sentence for both. 
Analogy in the economy: cooperation in horizontal and vertical direction 
within country instead of confrontation among decision makers and execu-
tioners (firms, individuals) will lead to higher benefits for each of them and 
them all together. Individual in-tolerances, selfishness and envy are obsta-
cles for optimal cooperative solution in the country’s economy. 
Thus economic authorities (government, central bank) should cooperate 
with their blue chips as they are only remaining instrument for executing of 
domestic economic policy measures as macro policies are given up to 
Brussels and Frankfurt. For example: monetary policy measures (interest 
rate, exchange rate) can be executed by largest bank market maker which is 
market leader; building infrastructure as roads can be executed only by 
large building companies with their business plans to do that at home, not 
somewhere abroad. It is up to blue chips to direct and use domestic accu-
mulation for investment at home, because, at the end, cost-benefit analysis 
of projects retains qualitative elements of decision making. All externalities 
(social, ecological,) cannot be quantitatively validated in exact amount of 
profit to help choosing the best alternative. This is the only way that do-
mestic authorities retain some real decision making power to be able to 
execute their policies through blue chips as micro instruments. 
But for that to happen, authorities should support micro units to flourish in 
domestic hands, not sell them to foreigners or keep them under hostile, 
non-competitive domestic legal environment. Support means enabling them 
to grow and develop, similarly (and not better, selective, with preferential 
treatment) as their foreign competitors are treated at their home country or 
abroad in host country. Instead, frequently authorities restrict domestic blue 
chips in their business activities (for instance, in the case of banks, with 
higher restrictions on credit expansion, higher reserve requirements, restric-
tions on capital investment). They should allow mergers and acquisitions of 
domestic enterprises and financial institutions to become large enough to 
use economy of scale and scope as competitive edge against foreign com-
petitors. Preservation of National Identity and Interests in the Enlarged EU 
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4. Coase’s theorem (1939) in property rights theory states that, whatever is 
the starting distribution of property rights, if there are not too strong fric-
tions in the market, property rights will be eventually finally (re)distributed 
in the way which enables the most efficient use of property (highest possi-
ble profit returns). 
 
Table 1: Percentage of Leading Micro Units in Majority Domestic Ownership, 2000  
Country  Commercial  Banks  Insurrance  Companies   Enterprises 
U.K.    100%    100%         88% 
Germany   100%    100%         80% 
Austria        90%    100%         80% 
Italy        89%    100%     100% 
Ireland        80%    100%         80% 
Portugal      80%        80%          70% 
Greece       80%        40%          66% 
Norway      90%    100%         80% 
Croatia         0%        50%          66% 
Czech Republic       0%        20%          78% 
Hungary      10%        20%          15% 
Poland       10%        40%          45% 
Slovakia        0%        20%          70% 
Slovenia       66%    100%         80% 
Source: Dun & Bradstreet, Bloomberg; internal resources   
 
Therefore, it is OK for small countries to give themselves a chance and re-
tain at the start some of their blue chips in majority domestic ownership 
(and final business decisions made at home) to be able to execute domestic 
economic strategy. Market will finally lead to changes in ownership struc-
ture if results of the initial property rights distribution will not be optimal. 
Authorities need only to eliminate frictions on capital market to the level, 
experienced by other (large, developed) competitive countries in the EU.  Franjo Štiblar 
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As illustration from year 2000, it is clear from the table that the old EU-15 
members, even the poorest, still keep majority of leading blue chip compa-
nies in real and financial sector in domestic ownership, while 10 newcom-
ers to the EU (8 of them countries in transition) sold them to foreigners. 
Only Slovenia has still a chance to decide which way to go: to join the old 
EU winners with own material foundations or new EU members - losers 
under foreign economic domination. 
5. At the end, psychological elements are relevant for the process of fol-
lowing national/resident interest to preserve national/resident identity. 
Among usual weaknesses of people in small countries, for Slovenia, as an 
example, two are especially critical for purpose of this study, which indi-
cate their complex of “smallness”: envy of the first neighbor resident (not 
so much of distant foreigner in the neighboring country) and lack of self-
esteem and self-confidence. They frequently lead to decisions which are in 
benefit of foreign countries and damage domestic residents only to prevent 
domestic neighbor’s increase of welfare. They frequently make domestic 
people subdued servants to foreigners.  
Small countries need to proclaim explicitly and follow in action their na-
tional/residents interest which is for large and richer countries un-usual, not 
understanding and not necessary, taken as self-understanding. Their large 
size prevents them to be in danger regarding identity, although globaliza-
tion is starting to make big countries small even in this sense. 
b) Implications for the Economy  
Basic rule in formulation of economic strategy for acceding countries and 
later as already members of the enlarged EU should be to behave as equal, 
as winners, not as subordinated losers. Accession countries should follow 
the strategy and behavior of small and less developed EU members (Portu-
gal, Greece, Ireland), and not subordinate to the dictate of developed EU 
member states. For that purpose: 
a) Vertical cooperation (among decision makers in economic authorities 
and economic micro units) and horizontal cooperation (among decisions 
makers in micro units themselves) is preferred to conflict, confrontation Preservation of National Identity and Interests in the Enlarged EU 
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between them. It is struggle of elites, where political elite surrenders, 
looses power much of its power to the new center (Brussels, Frankfurt), not 
so directors, managers of domestic firms. The latter are becoming thus rela-
tively more important to the former in the future. One reaction of envy do-
mestic politicians could be to limit power of domestic businessmen, for in-
stance by enabling and forcing the sale of domestic blue chip companies to 
foreigners. Similarly, some managers are rather sold with their companies 
and work for foreigners than becoming subordinated second to fellow citi-
zen manager through domestic merger, acquisition or takeover.      
b) It is necessary for new EU members to enter the EU on the side of win-
ners not losers. For that to happen they need to retain some of the blue 
chips in majority domestic ownership at least for the start of EU member-
ship. This is exactly what existing old EU-15 are doing, even the smallest 
and poorest among them (Table for illustration). This way they will be able 
to execute their own economic strategies with own priorities. New EU 
members should use their geo-strategic privileged position in their 
neighborhood outside the EU. They should use it as backyard in which they 
will expand economic activities of their blue chips (and thus economy as a 
whole) to be large and strong enough for the struggle in highly competitive 
EU market. Similar is experience of small less developed EU members as 
Portugal (Latin America), Greece (Balkan), Ireland (Irish nationals in the 
USA and all around the world), Scandinavian members of EU (Baltic coun-
tries, Russia).  
c) Foreign direct (and portfolio) investments are desirable in acceding and 
small less developed EU members countries, but first of all as green field 
investments and acquisitions of loss-making domestic companies and fi-
nancial institutions. Selling all best blue-chips to foreigners would mean 
giving up “major horses for competition in the EU” and therefore forgetting 
the idea of executing some country specific economic and social strategy if 
it exists. That means losing sovereignty more than necessary and more than 
present EU members do. Accessing countries should follow the example of 
smallest and least developed EU members which keep majority of blue 
chips in domestic ownership and do not want to sell them altogether. If a 
reason for selling is lack of own capital and human resources, it is still bet-Franjo Štiblar 
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ter to borrow capital and to engage good managers (even if retired) from 
developed countries than surrendering ownership, which can be done only 
once and then for good. 
d) Due to technical progress in globalization process optimal size of micro 
units is increasing. To make domestic economic units competitive in EU 
and world markets mergers and acquisitions among themselves and their 
expansion abroad is needed to achieve economy of scale (minimum aver-
age total costs) and economy of scope. For that to happen, cooperation 
among domestic managers and owners and authorities, not confrontation 
among them, and strategy of expansion into neighborhood abroad (if do-
mestic market is too small) are needed.   
It is a hypocrisy of European Commission to fight domestic mergers and 
acquisition in the small EU members from the position of anti-monopolistic 
policy, but at the same time enabling the large European corporations to 
enter all domestic markets and, thus, in fact create pan-European monopo-
lies (breweries, banks, etc..). In fact, this creates even more monopolistic 
structure of the EU market than if internal mergers will be allowed. Many 
examples exist to illustrate that, for instance in banking intervention of 
Brussels against mergers in Greece, Sweden, Ireland, but at the same time 
in favor of European giant international banks to enter and expand even 
more. Such policy could be understood and defended to certain extent only 
as a creation instruments for the whole EU for execution of its economic 
strategy in competition  with the USA and Japan on world market. But, it is 
un-acceptable for small EU members, old and newcomers.            
e) There are several dimensions to implementation of equal opportunity 
approach of small, acceding countries to big and rich EU members. For in-
stance:  
•  managers and people on general in small EU member states (old and 
new) should get a chance to manage their own companies and to prove 
themselves as able decision makers and workers in the international 
(European) environment, similarly to managers of micro units in large 
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•  small EU members should also get some EU institutions with seat in 
their countries. 
V. Final Definition of Interest for Preservation of Identity 
of Permanent Residents in the Country – EU Member 
State 
a) Concluding guidelines 
Small and poor new EU member countries should adjust themselves and 
follow the example of  present small, less developed EU members in their 
strategies to achieve the highest possible welfare for its permanent resi-
dents. They should liberalize as much as big countries do and sell their blue 
chips to foreigners as EU members do. Market will correct if initial struc-
ture of ownership proves wrong, but, at least domestic forces should get a 
chance to prove themselves in wider scene. Within small country there 
should be cooperation between decision makers, authorities and managers 
for common goal instead of conflict. Envy and lack of self-confidence 
would make newcomers immediately inferior to old EU members and their 
countries periphery of enlarged EU. 
Small countries (old and new members of EU, especially less developed) 
should retain some blue chips in domestic ownership, or even more impor-
tant, should be able to make final decisions at home in their residents’ in-
terest. They should conduct economic policies to fulfill domestic economic 
strategies, where their goals differ from the EU average (ecology, social 
protection) and could not be realized by the necessary “average” measures 
of Brussels.  
Strategic goal of permanent residents in the new EU member countries (and 
the old small poor EU members) in present globalization and regionaliza-
tion processes in the world is to get the country as close as possible to the 
centers of the EU and make its residents (inhabitants) as much as possible 
equal-rights citizens of the first class (and not second class) in the EU and 
in the world. This should be a guideline for negotiators in accession process Franjo Štiblar 
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and after accession. An effort should be made to retain some sovereignty 
from the EU with activities outside the borders of EU, for instance with 
independent actions in the UN or other activities in wider world. 
Within such strategic orientation in the country’s interest are those activi-
ties, decisions, statements, views (passive and active reactions) which will 
bring forward at highest degree possible the working and creative capabili-
ties of permanent residents of the country in all areas of human life. With 
them they will increase the spectrum of their needs and degree of their sat-
isfaction and with it improve their welfare. They will achieve the quality of 
life as close as possible to the centers of “global village” named the EU, 
while in some domains (field) even surpass them, as for instance in cul-
tural, ecological or social awarness. At the same time, they will achieve 
with their statements, positions taken, behavior treatment of equal partner, 
admiration and respect of residents from the  center, which will contribute 
to the increase of self-esteem of residents in the small country. Part of af-
firmation of self-esteem is in realization of some independent interests of 
permanent residents of the country, their sovereignty, outside of the EU in 
the wider world scene, for instance in the UN and its specialized organiza-
tions, so that inhabitants of the country would not be blindly subordinated 
to only one center. Even such freedom increases welfare of its practitioners. 
b) Application to non-economic sphere of life 
The application of abstractly defined elements of term residential (national) 
interest into everyday life of individuals (residents, nationals, citizens) is a 
complex and difficult task. Therefore, next only some thoughts about pro-
cedure how to do it.  
The question appears how to decide, act, to affirm (bring forward) interest 
of permanent country’s residents (demographic component) and to achieve 
the level of welfare closest to the centers of global village (EU) ?  On one 
side there are elements of more passive acceptance of environment, repre-
sented for instance in cultural, ecological, social, economic quality of habi-
tat (environment where we live). On other side, are efforts to create condi-
tions for possibility of more active engagement of people (residents) in dif-Preservation of National Identity and Interests in the Enlarged EU 
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ferent areas such as the economy, science and education, art and culture, 
sports, etc. 
In economic field, activities (views) fitting the most the criterion of resi-
dent interest are the ones with which the acceding countries will at the 
highest possible degree accede as equal economic partners and not subor-
dinated peripheral members of the EU. For that to happen, they need to de-
fine their own economic strategies to follow their specific interests (in Slo-
venia, for instance, it is defined by protection of ecological, social and eth-
nical levels above standards in the EU as related to the level of country’s 
economic development). But, it they want to execute strategies and not 
only proclaim them as  wishful thinking, they need instruments for imple-
mentation. With economic macro-policies surrendered to Brussels and 
Frankfurt they need strong domestic micro pillars. These could be only 
“blue chips” from real and financial sector in majority domestic, or better 
permanent resident’s, ownership or, even more precise, in such corporate 
governance arrangements that their final decisions are made in the country 
according to their national (state, resident) interests. In that case, decision-
makers which are permanent residents, will not decide for activities which 
are against the interest of the environment (country) they live in.
7 With 
having some blue chips in domestic ownership and with exploiting opti-
mally geo-strategic position of domestic country (which means using 
neighborhood region as interest zone and “domestic” backyard, where 
country can economically prosper and draw resources to be powerful 
enough in harsh competition at the EU/world markets; for instance, Slove-
nia should use its position between East and West and with Yugoslav Suc-
cessor States as interest zone) it will be possible to fulfilling its economic 
interests.  
In non-economic spheres of human life should be included as criteria for 
affirmation of resident interest ecologic, health and social protection, dis-
 
7 Consistent derivation of resident interest principle, which, by the way, does not neces-
sary cover all the elements of preservation of national identity, while »resident's iden-
tity« is too vague term, would mean that interests of permanent residents in the coun-
try should prevail over interest of nationals if they live permanently abroad and/or do 
not cherish their national identity.   Franjo Štiblar 
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semination of knowledge with education and implementation of technical 
progress, advancement of arts and culture, protection of language, preser-
vation of national heritage, expansion of sports and recreation, democrati-
zation of media and information freedoms, and other similar activities, 
views, solutions, which will bring country as close as possible to the high-
est standards in centers of global village, that is highest possible welfare of 
its permanent residents. 
These spheres of human life differ between each other as some require less 
from the human being – only willingness of passive acceptance of the 
benefits of quality, while the state institutions through its mechanisms and 
the civil society should supply (offer) them. Here are for instance ecologi-
cal protection of nature, social protection of individual. In other activities 
individual should exert more active role. Science and education, art and 
culture, sports and recreation require for optimal success (fulfilling resi-
dents interest in the form of their highest possible welfare) active participa-
tion, not only passive reception. Recreation and amateur engagement with 
these activities increases the quality of life of majority of permanent resi-
dents in the country, while professional success in art and cultural events, 
achievements in science, success of countrymen and women in world sport 
competitions means a very strong identification factor for permanents resi-
dents of acceding and smaller EU member countries (especially for newly 
independent country as for instance Slovenia). 
 It is not enough for improving the quality of life just to watch on TV the 
best operas and performers, best sport events and layers, best scientists and 
their work only or by traveling to centers to see them (Vienna, Paris, Ber-
lin, London), as presently more and more determined by the power of 
money. It is not satisfactory that nationals play and perform only abroad. 
Instead, at least in some niches, in some fields, excellent good opera 
houses, theatres, sport teams should be organized in home country so that 
they can be admired alive and will contribute to the welfare of domestic 
people including increase in their self-esteem. In strategic sense, due to 
lack of capital and human resources in the small less developed countries in 
comparison with developed large members of EU it is of utmost impor-Preservation of National Identity and Interests in the Enlarged EU 
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tance for smaller less developed EU members to prioritize among activities 
and fields and develop in niches of their comparative advantage the world 
standards and competitive qualities. Selection is necessary. 
If the goal of maximization of general (resident) interest and satisfaction 
(welfare) is to be achieved, the strategy should be to choose the activities, 
solutions, which will help to develop new needs and desires and higher de-
gree of their satisfaction, which will lead to higher welfare and self-esteem 
of domestic people. 
Critical question is, however, whether or not Slovenia and other acceding 
countries as well as small and less developed EU member countries will 
have enough time and power to use the additional creative impulses which 
come from the membership in new (rich) club of EU (and for some as Slo-
venia, additional impulse comes from the pure fact of the independence for 
the first time in the history), or they will be drowned in supra-state entity of 
enlarged EU before they will have a chance to use successfully these im-
pulses. Franjo Štiblar 
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